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Abstract
Other People's Money: The Effects of
Ownership on Compensation Strategy and Executive Pay
In this paper we develop and test hypotheses based on agency theory and managerial
capitalism to address the question of whether firms' compensation strategies are designed to
motivate actions in the interests of equity holders or those of management. We examined
differences in the organizational incentive structure of lower-level xecutives in
management-controlled, owner controlled, and owner-managed firms. We found that when
managers controlled the firm, there was pervasively weak incentive alignment for managers
within the hierarchy and that, beyond base pay, they were able to extract compensation
premiums through bonuses and long-term incentives, in spite of the fact that their firms did not
demonstrate better economic performance than other types of firms. We were also able to
demonstrate that equity holders pay substantial agency costs in management-controlled firms
compared with owner-controlled firms. We end with a discussion of the organizational context
for rationalizing executive compensation and the role of compensation consultants.
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Ten years ago, the academic discourse on executive compensation focused, almost
without exception, on whether or not the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the
largest U.S. corporations was designed so that executive decision making would be directed at
maximizing firm performance. There was a spirited theoretical debate and derivative empirical
literature around the question of whether top executives, particularly chief executive officers,
earned their pay. Some argued that they are " worth every nickel they get" (Murphy, 1986: 125),
while others maintained that there is "no rational basis for the compensation paid to top
management" (Kerr and Bettis, 1987: 661). One's theoretical and ideological position colored
the answer: Agency theorists tended to support the position that CEOs merited their pay, while
managerial capitalists tended to criticize pay levels.
The broader and perhaps more important question that this work failed to address is
whether incentive structures in organizations were designed to ensure that managerial decision
making is directed toward maximizing firm performance. Such inquiry requires knowledge about
the nature of incentives for managers throughout the firm. The typical research on CEO
compensation cannot contribute to answering this question unless one of the following
assumptions is made: either (1) the incentive structure of lower-level managers is similar to that
of the CEO, with similar motivational properties, or (2) the incentive structure for lower-l vel
managers is irrelevant so long as the CEO's is designed to maximize firm performance.
Fortunately, current research on managerial compensation is beginning to examine incentive
structures within the organizational hierarchy, shifting away from the focus on CEO pay to the
study of the determinants of pay for lower-lev l managers (e.g., Abowd, 1990; Gerhart and
Milkovich, 1990; Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt, 1991; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992; Lambert,
Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993). The dominant question, however, remains exactly the same as for
CEO pay: To what extent does the managerial compensation structure provide incentives to
maximize firm performance?
One way to answer the question is to understand the choices that are made in the
design of the firm's compensation strategy - the way that firms orchestrate different components
of pay, such as base pay, bonuses and incentives, and benefits, so that they are effective
motivational and control mechanisms to achieve different organizational performance
objectives. These choices are made in four distinct areas of compensation policy. The first is the
pay-level policy, which determines whether the firm will lead, meet, or lag the current market
wage level (Weber and Rynes, 1991; Milkovich and Newman, 1993). The second is the
pay-structure policy, or the relationships between pay at the various levels of the organization.
The third area is individual differences in pay, such as how pay is related to performance,
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organizational tenure, or other human capital indicators such as age and experience. Finally,
the benefits policy is the basis for how the firm voluntarily provides employees with indirect
financial compensation, including various forms of income security, capital accumulation, and
service programs.
Drawing on concepts from agency theory and managerial capitalism, this study
addresses the question of whether the compensation structures of managers at lower levels of
the organizational hierarchy are designed to motivate actions in the best interests of equity
holders or to serve the interests of the entrenched management. We also attempt to reveal
some of the underlying internal processes that lead to the specific form a firm's compensation
strategy takes.
Theoretical Foundations
In agency theory, the firm is defined as a system of explicit and implicit contracts among
those who participate in it, such as owners, managers, workers, and the suppliers of capital.
Owners are seen as principals who contract with agents (the managers) to "perform some
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent"
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 308). The principal is faced with the problem of controlling the
agent, because (1) both principals and agents are assumed to be rational and self-maximizing
individuals with divergent interests, (2) agents can have private information that the principal
cannot learn without costs, creating information asymmetry, and (3) the agent is assumed to be
work- and risk-averse.
The principal seeks to control the agent through monitoring and/or risk sharing.
Monitoring involves gathering information on the agent's effort, on random external factors that
may affect the success of the agent's efforts, and on the outcomes of the agent's activities
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McGuire, 1988). If information about all three is available, no
agency problem exists, because a contract can be specified based on the appropriateness of
the agent's actions. Monitoring is unnecessary, however, if there is optimal risk sharing between
the principal and the agent, because the incentives of both will be aligned. Incentive alignment
can be achieved through contracts that make the agent's compensation contingent on outcomes
of the agent's performance (McGuire, 1988; Hunt and Hogler, 1990; Baiman, 1990).
Control by the principal, however, incurs some agency costs (Jensen and Meckling,
1976): monitoring costs to the principal from instituting incentive schemes, monitoring
procedures, supervision, and adding supervisory levels, information and budgeting systems,
reporting procedures, and boards of directors (McGuire, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989); bonding
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expenditures that are implicit in suboptimal risk sharing; and residual losses arising from
unresolved agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Jensen and Murphy (1990) believe that while the agency model has been extensively
developed theoretically and has generated many hypotheses about CEO compensation, the
results of empirical work based on it have often been inconsistent with the theory's formal
models of contracting. This is due in large part to internal political forces that affect the contract
but are not accounted for in the theory or are not amenable to assessment with the
methodology commonly used (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). These political forces are considered
in managerial capitalism, which places managerial power in a more central theoretical position
(Berle and means, 1932; Marris, 1964).
The key proposition of managerial capitalism is that the degree of managerial power in a
firm is a function of the distribution of equity holdings, which defines the ownership structure.
When equity holdings in large firms are widely dispersed, principals have less influence over
management and the board of directors, which, though formally charged with representing the
owners, is in fact controlled by management. In these management-controlled firms, managers
can act in their own interests at the expense of the owners. When equity holdings are more
highly concentrated in a single stockholder, principals can exert more influence over
management, and such firms are owner-controlled. When the managers have large equity
holdings, the firm is called owner-managed.
The ownership structure will be reflected in the way managers are paid, since the firm's
compensation strategy is one way to align the incentives of principals and agents. When
managerial power is high as a result of equity dispersion, managers can reduce their
compensation risk by designing pay structures that minimize the effects of fluctuating
performance, because they have more influence than the board of directors in setting their own
compensation (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989). The evidence for this comes from extensive
research on CEO compensation that shows a strong relationship between firm performance and
CEO pay in owner-controlled firms, while pay is strongly related to growth and sales increases
in owner-controlled firms (McEachern, 1975; Allen, 1981; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987;
Dyl, 1988; Kroll, Simmons and Wright, 1990).
Whether similar relationships exist at lower levels within the firm, under different kinds of
ownership structures, remains empirically untested. The question is important, because Fama
and Jensen (1983) contended that internal agency problems are resolved by relatively cheap
monitoring that is achieved through decision hierarchies, mutual monitoring, and boards of
directors. In these decision hierarchies, higher-lev l agents ratify and monitor the decisions,
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initiative, and performance of lower-level agents. Mutual monitoring systems exist when agents
interact to produce outputs and acquire low-cost information about their colleagues. Essentially,
lower-level managers (themselves agents) act as principals who screen individuals, monitor
inputs, and obtain information about the state of the world (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Stiglitz,
1975).
It is not clear that these internal monitoring mechanisms are so cheap. There are a
number of problems when managers within the firm act as principals, monitoring other agents
further down the organizational hierarchy (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988). First, unless the
agent-monitors are themselves monitored or there is risk sharing, they will have little reason to
enforce value-maximizing contracts with subordinates. Second, monitoring may be unreliable,
because agents must bear all of the monitoring costs but receive little benefit from more
accurate monitoring. These costs include the effort necessary for monitoring as well as the
psychological costs of poor relationships with subordinates or peers that are the result of
imposing controls. Third, a lack of monitoring may go all the way to the board of directors, which
may have little financial incentive to exercise control but may bear substantial financial risk
because of its fiduciary responsibility.
These arguments suggest that while there may be monitoring and incentive alignment at
the highest managerial levels by boards of directors, there will be increasingly larger
decrements in control, or control loss, as monitoring cascades through hierarchical levels
(Williamson, 1967). Theoretically, control loss is dependent on precisely the same factors that
affect the principal- gent relationship at the CEO level: information asymmetry, imperfect
measures of agents' behavior or outcomes, and the effects of exogenous factors on the agent's
performance (Demski and Sappington, 1987). One manifestation of control loss is that the
alignment of managerial compensation and firm performance will weaken at progressively lower
levels of the organizational hierarchy, and this should be apparent in the firm's compensation
strategy.
If the ownership structure does affect the way that managers are paid, as suggested
above, then there should be some obvious differences in the compensation strategies of
different firms as a function of their different ownership structures. The essential difference, and
the central thesis in this study, is that there will be greater control loss (or weaker incentive
alignment) in management-controlled firms than in owner-controlled firms and owner-managed
firms. We therefore formulated hypotheses about differences in the compensation strategies for
managers at lower hierarchical levels in these types of firms. They specifically focus on how the
ownership structure is related to pay-level policy, pay-structure policy, and policies that govern
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individual differences in pay. Benefit policies were not studied because there was no information
available in the dataset used for the analysis.
Hypotheses
Ownership structure and pay-level differences. Firms make decisions as to whether
they should pay above, meet, or pay below prevailing labor market rates. Since the evidence
shows that agency costs to principals due to excessive CEO compensation are greater in
management-controlled firms than in owner-controlled firms (Allen, 1981; Dyl, 1988; Santerre
and Neun, 1989), it can be expected that this same relationship should also hold at lower
hierarchical levels, for two reasons. First, paying above-mark t wage may make the upper-level
manager's job easier, because such a strategy makes it easier to attract and retain employees.
Second, since pay differences between levels are relatively stable (Simon, 1957; Mahoney,
1979), providing higher pay for subordinates will have the effect of elevating top-level managers'
own pay. In owner-managed firms, there should be no principal-agent problem, because
managers hold a significant share of ownership in owner-ma aged firms. Thus owner-managed
firms should behave like owner-controlled firms (McEachern, 1975). Therefore,
Hypothesis 1: Management-controlled firms will have higher levels of
management pay than owner-controlled and owner-managed
firms.
Ownership structure and pay-structure differences. The pay structure, the
relationships between pay at the various organizational levels, can be visualized as a pay curve
on which is plotted the average pay for each organizational level. The pay curve may be
described in terms of the height of he pay structure and degree of inequality in the pay
structure.
Pay structure height refers to (1) the magnitude of the pay differential between pay
grades and (2) the number of pay grades between the highest-earning and lowest-earning
workers. Because pay differences between levels are relatively stable (Simon, 1957; Mahoney,
1979), managerial pay will be higher in firms with taller organizational structures. Furthermore,
the number of levels is also related to organization complexity, another factor often used to
justify higher managerial pay. Finally, managerial pay levels will be affected by the percentage
pay differences between organization levels. Thus we would expect greater interrank pay
differentials, more organization levels, and greater pay inequality between levels in
management-controlled firms. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2:Management-controlled firms will have taller pay structures than
owner-controlled and owner-managed firms.
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Hypothesis 3: Management-controlled firms will have greater pay inequality
between levels than owner-controlled and owner-managed firms.
Ownership structure and individual differences in pay. If monitoring and risk sharing
do cascade through the organization, then the form they take at lower levels should be affected
by the form at the highest levels, though it should be less pronounced at lower levels. It has
been shown that CEO pay in owner-controlled firms is closely related to performance, while in
management-controlled firms it is closely related to firm size (McEachern, 1975; Hunt, 1986;
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987). This suggests that there is greater compensation risk in
owner-controlled and owner-managed firms because the compensation strategy will be
designed in ways to link pay more strongly to firm performance than in management-controll d
firms. Thus,
Hypothesis 4:The managerial pay in owner-controlled and owner-managed
firms will be more strongly correlated with performance than in
management-controlled firms.
Hypothesis 5:The percentage of employees eligible for bonuses will be great r
in owner-controlled and in owner-managed firms than in
management-controlled firms.
Another important compensation strategy decision is how to relate pay to short-term and
long-term goals. Better-performing organizations have long-term compensation plans linked to
performance, while poorer performers have more restricted stock plans that are designed to
retain employees (Wiegman, 1988). Short-term incentives do not shift as much risk to managers
as long-term incentives, since long-term goals may be less clear and more uncertain
(Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne, 1988). According to managerial capitalism, pay in
management-controlled firms has a short-term orientation: Risk-averse managers should prefer
to avoid long-term incentives because they are far more uncertain and risky. Thus,
Hypothesis 6: Owner-controlled and owner-managed firms will use a greater
percentage of long-term performance incentives than
management-controlled firms.
Another compensation strategy decision is what proportion of total pay should be placed
at risk through the use of incentives. Incentives are related to increased organizational
performance (Terborg and Ungson, 1985), individual performance (Asch, 1990), shareholder
return (Abowd, 1990), productivity (Frisch and Dickinson, 1990), and lower quit rates (Lakhani,
1988) and absenteeism (Jacobson, 1989). Because higher percentages of variable managerial
pay have been shown to have positive effects on subsequent firm financial performance
(Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990), we hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 7: Managerial pay in owner-controlled and owner-managed firms will
have a greater percentage of bonus pay than managerial pay in
management-controlled firms.
There are different ways to design incentive systems. They may be linked to individual
goals or to corporate goals, such as earnings per share, growth, market share, and strategic
positioning (Meng, 1990). Given the managerial capitalism proposition (Berle and Mean, 1932;
Marris, 1964) and empirical evidence (McEachern, 1975; Allen, 1981; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and
Hinkin, 1987; Dyl, 1988; Kroll, Simmons and Wright, 1990) that management-controlled firms
will strive for growth while owner-controlled and owner-managed firms will strive for financial
performance goals that maximize shareholder wealth, we formulated a hypothesis about the
relationship between changes in pay and changes in financial performance:
Hypothesis 8:Changes in managerial pay will be related to changes in financial
performance and absolute financial performance level in owner--
controlled and owner-managed firms but not in
management-controlled firms.
While these eight hypotheses concentrate on the relationship of the ownership structure
to compensation strategy, other factors play an important role. For example, firm size,
performance, organizational level, responsibility, the type of industry, and human capital
indicators such as age, tenure and experience have been shown to be associated with pay
(Becker, 1964; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; O'Reilly, Main, and
Crystal, 1988; Milkovich and Newman, 1993; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992).
Thus, their effects are controlled for in the analysis that follows.
METHOD
Sample
The hypotheses were tested with compensation data from the Center for Advanced
Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) Data Base from the School of Industrial and Labor
Relations of Cornell University and with data on the ownership structure obtained from proxy
statements. The CAHRS database was made available by a large compensation consulting
firm. It covers the years from 1981 to 1988 and contains compensation information from over
800 organizations on more than 200,000 managers, representing a broad spectrum of positions
(e.g., CEOs, profit-center heads, and human resources generalists) and functional areas (e.g.,
manufacturing, marketing, and finance). The hierarchical level of managers represented varies
from level 1 (CEOs) to level 12 (supervisor in an organization with 12 levels of management).
The average years of firm participation in the database was 3.6 years.  Firms were only included
in this study if they did not experience a change in the ownership structure over the years for
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which compensation data are reported for them. This resulted in a sample of 307 firms from 34
industries. The firms averaged $4.86 billion in assets, 28,400 employees, and $5.30 billion in
sales.
Measures
Because the hypotheses relate firm ownership to firm compensation strategy, all
variables were analyzed at the firm level. We computed average variable values for the number
of years the firm was in the CAHRS database because pooling data across years provides more
accurate, reliable, and valid measures (McEachern, 1975; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin,
1987; Zajac, 1990). For variables used in the test of pay's sensitivity to changes in performance
(hypothesis 8), we computed change scores. All financial data were adjusted to December 1992
dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
Measures of compensation strategy. Measures were developed to assess how firms
approached the compensation strategy dimensions of pay level, pay structure, and individual
differences in pay.
The pay-level policy was assessed with three variables, total pay level, base-pay level,
and changes in total pay level. Total pay level is the average of all surveyed managers' salary
plus bonus. While other facets of compensation, such as the valuation of long-term contingent
pay arrangements, have been used in constructing pay variables (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and
Weigelt, 1993), simple measures of cash compensation are an effective proxy for total
remuneration (Agarwal, 1981; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Base pay level is the average of
all surveyed managers' base salary. Change in total pay level is measured by the average total
pay (salary + bonus) in year t minus the average total pay in year t-1, all divided by average
total pay in year t-1 for all surveyed managers for all years available.
The pay-structure policy dimension of compensation strategy was assessed by two
indicators. Inequality of the pay structure was assessed with two measures, the ratio of CEO
pay to average managerial pay and the Gini coefficient. Higher ratios of CEO pay to average
managerial pay show greater inequality of pay (Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Gerhart and
Milkovich, 1993). The Gini coefficient, another measure of pay inequality, is derived from the
Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve depicts the share of total labor costs received by the bottom t
(0<t<1) proportion of the employee population (Chakravarty, 1990). The Lorenz curve depicts
perfect pay equality (where all employees earn the same) as a straight line. Where there are
differences in pay, the Lorenz curve is concave. The Gini index equals 1 minus twice the area
under the Lorenz curve. Smaller Ginis indicate less inequality (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1993).
The Gini coefficient may have values between zero and one. If there is perfect pay equality in a
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firm, the Gini coefficient is zero. In a firm with perfect inequality, where one person earns all the
money, the Gini coefficient approaches one. The Gini coefficient can be computed by
n n
1.  S S   cI-cj
n2 I=1j=1
-
2c
where n= the number of employees and x= pay (Chakravarty, 1990).
The Gini was computed using estimates of average managerial pay and the spans of
control at each level. Consistent with theory and research, span of control was estimated as five
for CEOs, six for level-2 managers, seven for level-3 managers, nine for level-4 managers,
twelve for level-5 managers, sixteen for level-6 managers, and twenty for managers at level 7
and higher (Entwisle and Walton, 1961; Collins and Hull, 1986; Ouchi and Dowling, 1974). Had
the number of subjects at each level from each organization in the sample been used, rather
than these estimates, the resulting Gini Coefficients would have been strongly biased by the
number and level of managers reported by the firm, because some firms reported more
high-level employees than other firms.
Pay structure height is measured by the number of organization levels and the mean
percentage interrank pay differences. Given stable interrank pay differences, more hierarchical
levels lead to taller structures, and given any umber of hierarchical levels, a greater average
interrank percentage pay difference will lead to taller structures. Number of managerial levels
was available in the CAHRS data. Mean percentage interrank pay differences were calculated
from the database for all surveyed managers.
The individual-differences dimension of compensation strategy policy was assessed with
three indicators of how firm performance is related to pay. One is the p rcentage of employees
eligible for bonus, calculated by dividing the number of employees eligible for bonus by the total
number of employees per company. The second is the perc ntage of managers eligible for
long-term performance incentives, calculated by dividing the number of surveyed managers who
are eligible for long-term performance incentives by the total number of surveyed managers in
each firm. The third is bonus to total pay ratio, calculated by dividing the average bonus of
surveyed managers by the average total pay of surveyed managers in each firm.
Ownership structure. The ownership structure is a discrete variable that classifies
owner-controlled firms (N=154) as those in which at least 5 percent of the firm's outstanding
stock is in the hands of one individual or organization that was not involved in the actual
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management of the company, that did not deny beneficial ownership, that did not report only
disposition rights, or was not an employee benefit plan (McEachern, 1975; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi,
and Hinkin, 1987; O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988). Otherwise, firms were designated as
management-controlled (N=112), unless there was a manager with a 5 percent holding, in
which case they were designated as owner-managed (N=41). Empirical work has demonstrated
the suitability of the 5-percent cutoff as a proxy for monitoring (Hunt, 1986; Tosi and
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, in press).
Control variables. Measures were obtained for four classes of control variables:
organizational variables, human capital variables, job properties, and industry variables.
Organizational variables included size, change in size, financial performance, and
change in financial performance. Organizational size is a composite index constructed from a
factor analysis of the standardized values of assets, sales, and number of employees. These
separate standard scores were weighted by item loadings (.96, .95, .85, respectively) to obtain
the size measures. Change in size was also a composite index, constructed by first computing
changes in assets, sales, and the number of employees, factor analyzing the change scores,
and then using the factor loadings (.76, .79, .79, respectively) to construct the change in size
index. Financial performance, used generally as a control variable except in the case of
hypothesis 8, is a composite index constructed from standardized values of return on assets
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Change in performance is a composite index of the
standardized changes in ROA and ROE.
There were two managerial human capital variables: years of education and years of
experience. For both of these, increases or decreases could raise or lower pay levels. Each was
aggregated by firm. Years of education is the average years of education of all surveyed
managers in the firm. Change in years of education for year t was calculated as average years
of education in year t minus average years of education in year t-1, all divided by average years
of education in year t-1 for all years available. Years of experience is a composite measure that
includes years of firm-specific experience and potential market experience. Years of
firm-specific experience is the number of years the employee has been with the firm. Years of
potential market experience was calculated by age minus years of education minus 6; it
measures the potential experience of incumbents in the labor market (Gerhart and Milkovich,
1990). Change in years of experience for year t was calculated as average years of experience
in year t minus average years of experience in year t-1, ll divided by average years of
experience in year t-1 for all years available.
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There were two measures of job properties. Job level is defined as the number of
reporting levels between the company's board of directors and the position of the incumbent.
Employees supervised is the number of exempt and non-exempt employees supervised directly
and indirectly. It is a measure of supervisory responsibility.
Dummy variables were used to control for industry effects (O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal,
1988; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992). Firms were included in the analysis only if there were at
least two other firms with identical 2digit Standard Industrial Classification codes (Gerhart and
Milkovich, 1990; Leonard, 1990). Thirty-four industries are represented in the sample.
Analysis
The hypotheses were tested using ordinary least squares regression. Models were
specified with the dependent and independent variables relevant to each hypothesis. Size,
performance, the job variables, the human capital variables, and the industry dummy variables
were included as control variables when applicable because of their association with pay
(Becker, 1964; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990; O'Reilly, Main, and
Crystal, 1988; Milkovich and Newman, 1993; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992).1
RESULTS
The regression coefficients and standardized betas, and significance of each variable in
the model are shown along with the R2 and adjusted R2 of each model in the accompanying
tables. The results of the hypothesis tests are grouped by the three compensation policy
dimensions that were studied.
Ownership structure and pay-level differences. Dependent variables for hypothesis 1
were base and total pay. Table 1 shows the regression weights and standardized betas for the
variables in the two models (the 33 industry dummy variables were included in the model but
are not shown in the table). The total pay of managers in owner-c ntrolled and owner-managed
firms is significantly less than in management-controlled firms. The effects of ownership
structure to base pay approached conventional significance levels (p<. 06).
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TABLE 1: Regression Results for the Model of the Relationship between ownership and the
Managerial Pay Level
PAY LEVEL
Total Pay Base Pay
(N=271) (N=271)
Variables Regression Standardized Regression Standardized
Weights Beta Weights Beta
Mean Level   -$17,638**  -0.19 -$13,933**  -0.23
Mean Education $34,665** 0.30 $25,986** 0.35
Mean Experience $2,155** 0.14   $1,695** 0.17
Mean # of Emps Supervised $21** 0.61    $11** 0.48
Performance $6,310** 0.09     $170 0.00
Size -$2,339     -0.03  $3,335 0.06
Owner-Controlled -$13,095** -0.10 -$6,431 -0.07
Owner-Managed                -$15,044*              -0.08 -$7,213 -0.06
R2 0.82** 0.80**
Adjusted R2 0.78** 0.76**
Note:      *  p<.05 **  p<.01
To investigate the cascading effects of incentive alignment and monitoring, identical
regression models for total pay were computed for managers from the first through the sixth
hierarchical levels.2 The results are shown in Table 2. Mean number of employees supervised
was not included in the model for CEOs (level 1), because the number of employees supervised
is equivalent to total number of employees in the firm, a factor used to create the size variable.
Compared with owner-controlled firms, management-controlled firms pay their managers more
at all six hierarchical levels studied (p.05). This also appears to be the case for owner-managed
firms, though the regression coefficients are significant only for levels 1 and 3 (p< . 05) .
The tests of hypothesis 1 show the cost of being a manager in an owner-controlled or
owner-managed organization. Managers in owner-controlled firms and owner-managed firms
earned an average of $6,431 and $7,213 less in salary and $13,095 and $15,044 less in total
pay, respectively, than those in management-controlled firms when controlling for individual, job,
organization, and industry effects (see Table 1, above). These figures vary substantially by
hierarchical level, with greater differences at higher levels (See Table 2).
Other People’s Money WP 94-12
Page 15
TABLE 2: Regression Results for the Model Testing the Relationship of Ownership to Total
Pay, by Hierarchical Level
TOTAL PAY BY LEVEL
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
(N=264) (N=267) (N=270) (N=258) (N=239) (N=200)
Variables Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
(S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.)
Mean $7,781 $39,537 $30,467 $20,834 $18,101 $8,708
Education (.03) (.19)** (.21)** (.24)** (.39)** (.29)**
Mean $3,250 $3,823 $2,755 $2,628 $1,751 $1,049
Experience (.07) (.13)* (.14)** (.22)** (.21)** (.18)**
Mean # of $7.39 $16.5 $25.6 $17.9 $27.9
Emps Supd (.50)** (.52)** (.44)** (.27)** (.33)**
Performance $32,695 $25,324 $8,808 $4,505 $1,153 -$359
(.09) (.14)** (.09)* (.07)* (.03) (-.O1)
Size $265742 $36,761 $24,124 $17,890 $15,318 $16,169
(.58)** (.17)** (.20)** (.24)** (.30)** (.38)**
Owner- -114850 -$45535 -$23221 -$10260 -$7,899 -$7,299
Controlled (-17)** (-14)** (-13)** (-.09)* (-.10)* (-.10)*
Owner- -219063 -$43013 -$22206 -$10992 -$8,001 -$9,339
Managed (-22)** (-.09) (-.08)* (-.06) (-.07) (-.09)
R2 .60** .65** .76** .77** .79** .75**
Adjusted R2 .52** .58** .72** .72** .75** .69**
Note:    *  p<.05 ** p<.01 Standardized Betas in Parentheses
The ownership structure and pay-structure policy. Results of tests of hypothesis 2,
in Table 3, showed no relationship between the ownership structure and height of the pay
structure. Further, the results in Table 4 show that pay inequality was not related to the
ownership structure, as was predicted by hypothesis 3.
TABLE 3: Regression Results for the Model Testing the Relationship Between Ownership
and Pay Structure Height
PAY STRUCTURE HEIGHT
Number of Managerial Mean Total Pay Difference Mean Base Pay Difference
Levels (N=307) Between Levels (N=297) Between Levels (N=297)
Variables Weights Weights Weights
(Std. Betas) (Std. Betas) (Std. Betas)
Size 0.54** -0.00 -0.02
 (0.30) (-0.02) (-0.08)
Performance    -0.07 0.02 0.00
(-0.05) (0.08) (-0.03)
Owner-Controlled   -0.13 0.01 0.00
(-0.04) (0.03) (-0.01)
Owner-Managed   -0.14 -0.05 -0.04
(-0.03) (-0.09) (-0.09)
R2 0.22** 0.12 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.11** 0.00 0.01
Note: *  p<.05 ** p<.01
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TABLE 4: Regression Results for the Model Testing the Relationship Between Ownership
and Pay Structure Inequality
PAY STRUCTURE INEQUALITY
Total Pay Base Pay
Gini Pay Ratio CEO to Manager Gini Pay Ratio CEO to Manager
(N=274) (N=300) (N=274) (N=300)
Variables Weights Weights Weights Weights
(Std. Betas) (Std. Betas) (Std. Betas) (Std. Betas)
Size 0.005** 0.08 0.006** -0.02
(0.16) (0.04) (0.19) (-0.02)
Performance 0.001 0.08 0.000 -0.09
(0.02) (0.05) (-0.02) (-0.08)
Number of -0.014** 0.55** -0.012** 0.40**
Managerial Levels (-0.67) (0.52) (-0.69) (0.53)
Owner- 0.001 -0.04 0.001 -0.13
Controlled (0.01) (-0.01) (0.02) (-0.06)
Owner-Managed -0.001 -0.43 0.002 -0.33
(-0.01) (-0.09) (0.03) (-0.10)
R2 0.50** 0.40** 0.52** 0.43**
Adjusted R2 0.41** 0.32** 0.45** 0.34**
Note:     *  p<.05 **  p<.01
Ownership structure and individual differences in pay. Table 5 reports the results of
the test of hypothesis 6, the relationship between firm performance and total pay as a function
of the ownership structure. Separate regressions were computed for both owner-controll d and
management-controlled firms, controlling for the number of employees supervised, hierarchical
level, education, experience, and industry. There were not enough owner-managed firms to
conduct an analysis. The results showed the ownership structure did not affect the relationship
between firm performance and total pay.
TABLE 5: Regression Results for the Model Testing the Relationship Between Ownership,
Firm Performance and Managerial Pay
TOTAL PAY LEVEL
Owner-Controlled (N=114) Manager-Controlled (N=68)
Variables Regression Weights Std. Beta Regression Weights Std. Weights
Mean Level -$20,262** -0.27 -$21,332** -0.22
Mean Education $24,719** 0.31 $45,858** 0.33
Mean Experience $1,638- 0.12 $3,709** 0.22
Mean # of Emps Supervised $24** 0.56 $16** 0.65
Size $22,644 0.12 -$1,943 -0.02
Performance $3,982 0.06 $7,300 0.07
R2 0.83** 0.85**
Adjusted R2 0.79** 0.80**
Note: *  p<.05 ** p<.01
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Hypothesis 7, which specified the relationship between ownership structure and the
percentage of employees eligible for bonus was supported in part, as shown in Table 6.
Owner-managed firms have significantly greater percentages of bonus-eligible employees than
owner-controlled or management-controlled firms (p<.05).
TABLE 6: Regression Results of the Models Testing the Relationship Between Ownership
and Incentives
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Percentage of Bonus Percentage of Managers Percentage of Bonus
Eligible Employees Eligible for Long-term Pay to Total Pay for
Incentives Managers
(N=295) (N=303) (N=306)
Variables Weights Weights Weights
(Std. Betas) (Std. Betas) (Std. Betas)
Size 0.001 0.021 0.016*
(0.01) (0.06) (0.15)
Performance -0.010 0.036 0.030**
(-0.09) (0.11) (0.31)
Owner-Controlled 0.018 -0.107** -0.029*
(0.08) (-0.18) (-0.16)
Owner-Managed 0.050* -0.225** -0.056**
(0.16) (-0.25) (-0.21)
R2 0.23** 0.20** 0.30
Adjusted R2 0.12** 0.09** 0.21
Note: *  p<.05 ** p<.01
The results of the test of hypothesis 6, designed to assess the use of long-term
incentives in the different classes of ownership, were opposite from the predicted direction.
Table 6 shows that management-controlled firms made greater use of long-term incentives than
owner-controlled and owner-managed firms (p<.01).
Table 6 shows similar opposite results for the test of hypothesis 7, which stated that
firms with influential owners would design compensation strategies in which bonuses would be
more extensively used than when managers are in control. Management-controlled firms had a
significantly higher percentage of bonus to total pay than owner-controlled and owner-managed
firms (p< .01).
Hypothesis 8 assessed the sensitivity of changes in pay to changes in performance as a
function of ownership structure. It was tested only for firms that participated in the survey for at
least two consecutive years and only if they were in an industry that contained three or more
firms in the sample after separating the data by ownership. The results of the test for the whole
sample, displayed in Table 7, show that change in performance (p<.01) and absolute
performance (p<.05) are both related to change in total pay for owner-controlled firms but not for
management-controlled firms.
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TABLE 7: Regression Results of Models Testing the Relationships Between Ownership and Changes
in Pay for the Total Sample
CHANGE IN TOTAL PAY
Owner-Controlled Manager-Controlled
(N=73) (N=56)
Variables Regression Std. Regression Std. Beta
Weights Beta Weights
Change in Mean Level -0.54** -0.29 -0.31 -0.25
Change in Mean Education 0.99* 0.08 -1.46 -0.30
Change in Mean Experience -0.18 -0.06 -0.16 -0.09
Change in Mean # of Emps Supd 0.32** 0.84 0.29** 0.65
Change in Size  -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.17
Size  -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00
Change in Performance 0.03** 0.10 0.01 0.20
Performance 0.014* 0.08 0.003 0.05
R2 0.93** 0.35**
Adjusted R2 0.92** 0.24**
Note:    *  p<.05 ** p<.01
The cascading effects of incentive alignment were tested with identical models of total
pay by hierarchical level for levels 1 through 6 for ownerc ntrolled firms and for
management-controlled firms, including industry dummy variables. The results are shown in
Tables 8 and 9. Because no industry dummy variables were significant and each adjusted R2
was reduced with the inclusion of the industry controls for both the owner-controlled and
management-controlled samples, the models were run without the industry controls. In
owner-controlled firms, change in total pay is significantly related to change in performance for
the top three managerial levels (p.>05).  There were no such effects in management-controlled
firms.
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TABLE 8: Regression Results of the Models Testing the Relationship Changes in Total Pay
and Changes in Performance by Hierarchical Level in Owner-Controlled Firms
CHANGE IN TOTAL PAY BY LEVEL
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
(N=72) (N=72) (N=73) (N=69) (N=64) (N=48)
Variables Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
(S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.)
D Mean -1.20 1.92** 2.11** -0.87 0.98* 0.46*
Education (-0.34) (0.39) (0.49) (-0.26) (0.30) (0.35)
D Mean -0.02 0.04 0.31 -0.15 0.36** 0.21**
Experience (-0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (-0.22) (0.53) (0.49)
D Mean # of 0.00** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Employees Supervised (0.37) (0.15) (0.21) (-0.15) (0.05)
D Size 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.11) (0.08) (0.28) (0.11)
Size -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
(-0.17) (-.14) (0.01) (-.12) (-0.08) (0.02)
D Performance 0.05* 0.04* 0.04** 0.03 0.01 -0.02
(0.28) (0.23) (0.31) (0.26) (0.09) (-0.20)
Performance 0.03 0.03* 0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.01
(0.23) (0.24) (0.17) (0.30) (-0.09) (0.15)
R2 0.19* 0.32** 0.29** .19 .22* .34**
Adjusted R2 0.12* 0.25** 0.22** .09 .13* .23**
Note: *  p<.05 ** p<.01
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TABLE 9: Regression Results of the Models Testing the Relationship Changes in Total Pay
and Changes in Performance by Hierarchical Level in Management-Controlled Firms
CHANGE IN TOTAL PAY BY LEVEL
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
(N=56) (N=56) (N=56) (N=55) (N=50) (N=42)
Variables Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
(S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.) (S.B.)
D Mean -0.40 0.63 1.29 -1.16* -0.41 0.76
Education (-0.15) (0.10) (0.21) (-0.30) (-0.08) (0.25)
D Mean -0.02 0.66** 0.31 0.17 0.35 0.43**
Experience (-0.15) (0.43) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.48)
D Mean # of 0.01 0.10** 0.00 0.04 0.03**
Employees Supervised (0.09) (0.38) (0.18) (0.20) (0.49)
D Size -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06** 0.03 -0.02
(-0.07) (0.26) (0.06) (0.39) (0.19) (-.11)
Size 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.05) (-.04) (-.21) (-.21) (-0.08) (-.08)
D Performance 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
(0.21) (0.24) (0.17) (0.21) (0.16) (-0.12)
Performance 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03** 0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (-.13) (-0.33) (0.00) (0.06)
R2 0.08 0.25* 0.33** .39** .17 .47**
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.14* 0.23** .30** .03 .36**
Note: *  p<.05 ** p<.01
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Several caveats must be taken into account when considering the results. First, the
sample of firms is not random, but limited to clients of the consulting firm that provided the data
to CAHRS. Second, the data contain neither the actual nor estimated values of benefits and
long-term incentives, nor is there any information about how bonuses were actually determined,
prohibiting analyses of these variables. Third, it is likely that the consulting firm used a
somewhat standard set of recommended practices, such as job evaluation methods and
industry surveys, that may limit the variance in the compensation strategies of the participating
firms, increasing the difficulty of detecting true effects of the ownership structure. Fourth, since
more complete data were not available about the distribution of personnel at different levels and
the number of organizational levels, it was necessary to estimate values for these variables for
each firm in the tests of hypotheses about pay structure height (hypothesis 2) and pay inequality
(hypothesis 3).
These limitations notwithstanding, there are several implications of the results worth
noting. One thing they demonstrate is the pervasiveness of weak incentive alignment and
managerial compensation premiums in organizations when power is asymmetrically distributed
so that equity holders are disenfranchised relative to managers. Another is the differential costs
of compensation strategies to equity holders of owner-controlled firms compared with
management-controlled firms. They also prvide some insights that embellish the story of how
political processes operate to decouple the compensation strategy from firm performance while
maintaining the appearance of economic rationality when managers control firms. Finally, and
beyond the scope of the original research objective, some data-based impressions about the
role of compensation consultants in the executive compensation process emerged from the
analysis.
Incentive Alignment, Control Loss, and Compensation Premiums
It should come as no surprise that relationships between pay and performance that were
found at the CEO level (e.g., McEachern, 1975; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987; Main,
O'Reilly and Wade, 1993) are mimicked for managers at lower hierarchical levels. For the total
sample in this study, changes in firm performance as well as the absolute level of firm
performance were related to changes in pay in owner-co trolled firms but not in
management-controlled firms. For managerial levels below the CEO, changes in performance
were related to changes in pay for only the top three levels in owner-controlled firms. In
management-controlled firms, there was no relationship between changes in pay and changes
in firm performance for any executive level. In these firms, pay for lower-level management
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groups is decoupled from firm performance and not aligned with owners' interests, leaving them
with less compensation risk than their peers in owner-controlled firms.
Not only is the compensation risk lower in management-controlled firms, the
compensation strategy appears to be designed to provide substantial managerial pay
premiums. Overall, managers at the hierarchical levels studied were paid 8.2 percent more than
managers in owner-controlled firms and 9.5 percent more than those in owner-managed firms.
The pay differences are exaggerated as a function of organizational level. For example, the
average total pay of CEOs in management-co rolled firms was $219,000 higher than that of a
counterpart in an owner-managed firm. At the sixth hierarchical level, the average total pay
differential was $6,000. Two other studies of internal pay levels, both of which considered
managerial power, found similar effects. O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) reported a negative
correlation between xternal equity holdings and the mean salary of the top vice-pres d nts and
the mean salary of executive officers in their study of 105 firms in nine industries. Lambert,
Larcker, and Weigelt (1993: 457), in their study of four managerial levels in over 300 publicly
traded firms, also concluded that the existence "of a large shareholder ... has a negative
influence on the level of executive compensation."
There is no apparent economic justification for such premiums for the firms in this study,
since management-controlled firms did not perform better than owner-controlled firms, and they
were significantly worse performers than owner-managed firms.3 Therefore, these premiums
may be considered as a lower bound of an estimate of the agency costs incurred in
management-controlled firms. The average firm in this study had around 8,000 exempt
personnel, which includes both managers and professionals. Assuming the same
compensations differences apply to professional employees as applies to managers, the mean
total premium in management-controlled firms is about $105 million more than in
owner-controlled firms and about $120 million more than in owner-managed firms.
These results have implications for the control of internal agency problems. For
example, the issue of control loss may be moot in management-controlled firms, where there is
weaker incentive alignment and lower compensation risk for CEOs and, at the same time, there
is less monitoring of the compensation process than in owner-c ntrolled firms (Tosi and
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, in press). Weak incentive alignment at the highest
hierarchical levels is a virtual guarantee of even weaker controls at lower levels. Control will not
become stronger as it cascades down the hierarchy. The question that remains is what are the
bases of control criteria at lower executive levels within the management-controlled firm? One
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would speculate that they are related to perpetuating the power of the dominant coalition and
reducing managerial risk, while maintaining the facade of economic rationality.
There is a different control issue in owner-controlled firms. The incentive structure of the
dominant coalition is based on improving firm financial performance, seemingly aligning
managerial interests with those of owners. At lower levels, however, the nature of control
appears to change. Incentives are less strongly related to improving firm profitability, apparently
reducing the alignment of the interests of lower-level managers with the owners' interest. There
could be two possibilities for this finding. One is that aligning interests of the dominant coalition
is enough to lead to performance improvements. If this is so, control loss and incentive
alignment may be a more relevant issue for upper-management levels than for lower
hierarchical levels. The other is that the alignment of incentives at the top hierarchical levels by
strong pay-performance linkages is translated into other types of performance criteria at lower
levels that still effectively provide motivation to strive toward better economic performance.
Political Processes and Compensation Strategy
These results are consistent with the explanation that the agency contract is affected by
internal political processes and that these are revealed in the choices made about the
pay-structure strategy, the pay-level strategy, and the strategy that governs individual pay
differences in the firm. These political processes are played out by a cast of actors
(compensation consultants, boards of directors, board compensation committees, major
stockholders, and CEOs) in different ways in management-controlled, owner-controlled, and
owner-managed firms, always with the objective of providing the appearance of economic
rationality.
The pay-structure strategy. Pay structures in management-controlled firms are
designed in ways that make them similar to those in owner-c ntrolled and owner-managed
firms, giving no appearance that the interests of the entrenched management are particularly
favored. For example, the mean interrank percentage pay differences are the same for the
different classes of ownership (hypotheses 2), as is the nature of pay inequality within the firms,
as measured by the Gini coefficient (hypothesis 3). Further, the percentage of bonus-eligible
managers was similar in owner-controlled and in management-controlled firms. Only
owner-managed firms had a significantly higher percentage of bonus-eligible managers, a result
that was expected (hypothesis 6). Finally, management-controlled firms actually appear to
provide more performance incentives for top management because there is greater use of
long-term incentives (Hypothesis 7) and a greater percentage of bonus to total pay (Hypothesis
8).
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Pay-level strategies. The pay-level strategies in management-controlled firms appear
to be designed to lead the market in both base pay and total compensation. This conclusion is
based on the finding that pay is higher in management-controlled firms in the study and the
assumptions that (1) the firms included in the study are a representative sample of those
included in the more complete CAHRS database and (2) that this database was used in the
compensation surveys conducted by the consultant for its client firms. If this is so, then this
database defines the executive pay "market" that is used as the basis for the design of any
client's compensation program.
Since the firm's economic performance cannot be a justification for such a pay-level
policy, it must be rationalized in other ways, and it may be here that the role of the consultant is
important (Crystal, 1991). One way to provide a rationale is to select companies carefully to
include in the compensation survey to produce results that are acceptable to the dominant
actors in the pay process in the client firms. Another way is to aid the client firm in implementing
a policy of premium pay positioning for executive salaries, perhaps with the justification that the
firm will be able to attract higher-quality managers (Crystal, 1991).
Individual pay-difference strategies. One aspect of individual paydifference strategies
is the bonus component, in which there appear to be substantial premium-taking opportunities.
Management-controlled firms pay larger bonuses, and these make up a larger proportion f total
pay than in owner-controlled or owner-managed firms. In fact, more than 50 percent of the
difference in total pay between management-controlled and owner-controlled firms is accounted
for by bonuses.
The results suggest that the bases for determining bonuses vary as a function of the
ownership structure. The typical approach to determining bonuses is to allocate a percentage of
profits to a bonus pool, which is then in turn allocated to individual senior managers (Hills,
1987). In owner-controlled firms the triggering mechanism for the size of the bonus pool and the
basis for its distribution to lower-level managers appear to be improvements in firm
performance. In management-controlled firms, the triggering mechanism is not so obvious.
More than likely "the measures of performance used ... change from year to year. Hence, stock
price appreciation may be the justification this year, because it has been excellent. But if stock
price appreciation isn't so good next year, then earnings per share growth will be the measure
of choice, because it was decent in the past year" (Crystal, 1991: 15).
Organizational context of rationalizing executive compensation.
Although some have argued that consultants are among the "first culprits in ... a litany of
culprits" (Crystal, 1991) in the executive compensation process, these results suggest a slightly
Other People’s Money WP 94-12
Page 25
less harsh view: They are more likely supporting players. As vendors, they must design a
compensation strategy that meets the needs of organizational stakeholders who make the
purchasing decision. The effects of this obviously economic relationship are compensation
strategies that have different forms and favor owners or managers as a function of which
stakeholders are the most influential.
When managerial interests are dominant, the role of the consultant is to provide an
appropriately justified compensation strategy that can be ratified by the board of directors while
satisfying managerial interests. This takes place in a context of corporate governance that bears
the hallmarks of being responsive to conventional economic forces and fostering owners'
interests but, instead, is managed by the incumbent executives to their own advantage. The
most visible and ostensibly important corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors,
should be concerned primarily with the interests of owners and secondarily with those of
management, and it is generally thought that boards with less representation from management
and more outside members would act in ways more favorable to owners (Williamson, 1985).
Interestingly, while it appears that boards of management-controlled firms are structured with
higher percentages of outside board members (Boeker and Goodstein, 1993; Main, O'Reilly,
and Wade, 1993; Pi and Timme, 1993),4 creating the illusion that the board is independent of
management -- which would lead it to make the interests of owners a primary concern -- the
evidence indicates quite the opposite: Managerial pay is higher when boards are composed of
higher percentages of outside directors (Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990; Lambert,
Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993).
One explanation for this is that in management-controlled firms, social influence
processes strongly affect executive compensation levels, mediating the more direct,
conventional executive labor market forces (O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988; Wade, O'Reilly,
and Chandratat, 1990). In these firms, the dominant actors in determining CEO compensation
are the CEOs themselves (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989). They can affect the structure of the
board and the compensation committee by appointing board members who have high positions
and high salaries in other firms and/or by setting high levels of compensation and perquisites for
board members. In the absence of market forces, executive pay can easily be decoupled from
the interests of owners, permitting reciprocity norms and social comparison processes to
dominate pay setting (O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wade,
O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990). The effects, as O'Reilly and his colleagues suggest, are that
board members will likely choose compensation levels for the firm's managers that reflect their
own pay, resulting in more favorable treatment for the incumbent management. The consultant
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plays an enabling role, that of providing an appropriately rationalized compensation strategy that
allows this to happen.
This research led us to another conclusion, only indirectly related to the results, about
compensation research. We became convinced that, save some unlikely methodological or
theoretical breakthrough, there is little to be gained from additional research on CEO
compensation. There are many other issues to be investigated that might broaden our
knowledge of the internal incentive structure and how it is used by firms. One is the
performance criteria at middle hierarchical managerial levels in high-performing organizations
and the relationship of these criteria to those used at the top levels. A second is the extent to
which pay criteria may have shifted from period to period to justify pay increases and other
incentives in management-controlled firms. A third is the study of the actual justifications used
by boards of directors for premium compensation strategies in firms that do not have particularly
strong economic performance. The difficulty with such research is obvious. It requires data that
are not easily obtainable from most existing sources and that would therefore require a great
deal of effort to obtain. Unless we attempt to undertake inquiry of this type, however a simple
fact remains: We will be relegated to explanations about compensation based only on very
divergent theoretical frames from which can come only stronger ideological posturing and very
little useful knowledge.
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ENDNOTES
                                         
1 To conserve space, correlation matrices and descriptive statistics are not reported. They are
available on request from the authors.
2 There was no analysis of the cascading effects below the sixth organizational level because,
with the large number of industries used as control variables (n=34), the number of cases was
too small and would produce meaningless results. There were instances in which the same
problem occurred for analyses involving owner-managed firms.
3 A result not reported here demonstrated that there was no difference in the performance
between owner-controlled and management-controlled firms. Further, while Hunt (1986), in
reviewing the literature on ownership structure, concluded that there were no performance
differences related to the type of control, there are some other bases for arguing that
owner-controlled firms do perform better. First, while the research cited by Hunt (1986) is
equivocal in the matter of performance differences between ownership structure, it is very
possible that in those studies the performance differences between owner-controlled and
management-controlled firms are actually larger than reported, because management-controlled
firms choose accounting methods that overstate results in favorable ways (Sunder, 1973, 1975;
Biddle and Lindahl, 1982; Salamon and Smith, 1977). Second, a recent study by Tosi and
Gomez-Mejia (in press) found that compensation process monitoring was higher in
owner-controlled firms and, more importantly, it was correlated with firm performance.
4 The correlations are relatively small (@r=.15) and, for the most part, significant.
